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TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS: TIME FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL STATURE?
INTRODUCTION
Our jurisprudence .

.

. has recognized tribal authority as being both

preconstitutional and extraconstiutional. These principles are premises
for the conclusions that American Indian governments can be, for
example, theocratic, hereditary, and race-based in citizenship. Powerful
moral and historical considerations support this special tribal status.
European nations recognized similar notions half a millennium ago,
and in the United States all three federal branches have acknowledged
the special attributes of Indian tribal sovereignty from the beginning.,
The extraconstitutional status2 of Indian nations3 in the United States
is, in part, a result of a variety of political and historical factors that
encouraged the authors of the federal 4 and state5 constitutions to avoid
1. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, Timm, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112-13 (1987).

2. For a review of the extraconstitutional status of American Indian tribes, see generally Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225 (1994).
3. The terms "Indian nation" and "tribe" are used for general discussion though indigenous
nations within the United States use various terms for their collective identity, e.g., nation, pueblo,
band, community, rancheria, colony, and village.
4. The United States Constitution grants the Congress exclusive authority "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The only other mention the original constitutional provisions made of Indians
was to exclude "Indians not taxed" from those to be counted for apportioning direct taxes and
representatives. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This reference was repeated when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted for similar reasons. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. These provisions
have no practical effect today as Indians are now subject to taxation. See generally 57 Interior
Dec. 195 (1940) (Solicitor's Opinion on interpreting "Indians not taxed" provisions). The Federal
Constitution makes no other reference to the sovereign Indian nations within its borders.
5. Most state constitutions make no reference or only passing reference to the sovereign Indian
nations within their midst. The most common reference occurs in the enabling acts, required by
the U.S. Congress as a condition for admittance into the Union for most western states. The
language of New Mexico's Enabling Act is typical:
Sec. 2. [Control of unappropriated or Indian lands; taxation of federal government,
nonresident and Indian property.]
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all
right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying within the
boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired
through the United States, or any prior sovereignty; and that until the title of such
Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain
subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
congress of the United States ... ; but nothing herein shall preclude this state
from taxing as other lands and property are taxed, any lands and other property
outside of an Indian reservation, owned or held by any Indian, save and except
such lands as have been granted or acquired as aforesaid, or as may be granted
or confirmed to any Indian or Indians under any act of congress; but all such
lands shall be exempt from taxation by this state so long and to such extent as
the congress of the United States has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.
N.M. CONST. art. XXI, §2 (emphasis added). See also ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 12; ARIz. CONST.
art. XX, para. 4; CoLo. CONST. Enabling Act, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 19; NEv. CONST.
Ordinance; N.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. XXII and art.
XXVI, § 18; UTAH CoNsT. art. 3, para. 2; WASH. CONST. art. XXVI; WYo. CONST. art. 21, § 26.
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defining tribal status and tribal relations with the new national and state
governments in constitutional terms. The authors of the Federal Constitution, in particular, were confronted with a conflict between federal
and state claims to authority over Indian tribes. 6 Their solution to this
conflict was to grant the federal government authority to "regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes" 7 and make no other mention of
which sovereign would have authority over Indian affairs or how federal
and state relations with the tribes would otherwise be governed.
Despite this lack of clarity in the Federal Constitution and its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, 8 "the American Indian tribes have
been treated, in some form, as sovereigns or nation states within the
law of nations or international law" since the European invasion of the
Americas. 9 Significantly, "[t]he tribes were recognized as nations in international law before the formation of the republic."' 10 Arguably, this
recognition of nation status is reflected in the Federal Constitution, which
appears to treat the relationship between the United States and the tribes
much as it treated the new nation's relations to foreign nations."
The limited reference to Indian tribes and state-tribal relations in state
constitutions (particularly those in the western United States) is, ironically,
a result of federal dominance over all Indian law issues. 12 Many western
6. See generally Valencia-Weber, supra note 2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation addressed this issue by granting the Continental
Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of
any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated .... " 2 TiE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION 931-32 app. (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). James Madison criticized article IX in the
Federalist 42, as "obscure and contradictory" and observed that the definition of Indians, not
members of any of the states was a "question of frequent perplexity and contention." Id. at 67.
Moreover, Madison observed, "how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet
residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far
intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible." Id. at 67-68.
9. Valencia-Weber, supra note 2, at 227. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832) (discussing the sovereign status of Indian tribes, albeit subservient to the federal government).
10. Valencia-Weber, supra note 2, at 227 (citing COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
47-58 (1982 ed.); Robert A. Williams Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of
the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983)).
11. The Constitution grants the Congress the authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 (emphasis added). Moreover, the treaty making power of the executive branch governs the relations
between the United States and the Indian nations. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See ValenciaWeber, supra note 2, at 227 n.4. However, it is clear that the tribes no longer enjoy the status
of "foreign nations," under U.S. law; rather, they have been identified as sovereign "domestic
dependent nations." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
12. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized federal plenary power over
Indian tribes and Indian issues. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (stating that "[ilt is well established that Congress, in
the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of
the Indian tribes"); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (recognizing that Indian issues
are "solely within the domain of the [federal] legislative authority and its action is conclusive upon
the courts"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that Indian tribes are the
wards of the United States and that only the federal government can provide the necessary protection
of and control over the tribes and also holding that Congress's power over Indian affairs are
absolute and unreviewable by the Court).
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states were given a clear message to avoid any involvement in tribal lands
and governments when Congress required, as a condition of their admittance into the Union, that each state "forever disclaim all right and
title" to Indian lands within their borders. 3 Moreover, since the founding
of the Republic, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has
plenary authority over the sovereign "domestic dependent [Indian]
nations.' 1 4 In recent decades, however, the federal government's jealous
protection of its exclusive control over relations with the tribal sovereigns
has given way to Congressional encouragement of state-tribal interaction,
albeit lopsided in favor of state control. 5 Under recent statutory schemes,
the states have been granted control or influence over tribal decisions, 6
these changes in federal policy, which have resulted in significant contact
between the states and the tribes, highlight the need for structure in these
new relationships.
Most recently, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),1 7 Congress
granted states significant control over tribal gaming activity by allowing
them to decide if certain games of chance can be played on tribal lands. 8
"Under the IGRA, Class III gaming is lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are located in a state that 'permits such gaming . . . and
[it is] conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered
into by the Indian tribe and the State." '" 9 Despite this partial delegation
of federal authority over Indian gaming to the states, IGRA does require

13. In addition to New Mexico, the states of Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming were required as a condition
of their admittance to the Union to include language similar to the New Mexico Enabling Act,
See, e.g., supra note 5. See also ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 12; ARiZ. CONST. art. XX, para. 4;
CoLo. CONST. Enabling Act, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 19; NEV. CONST. Ordinance; N.D.
CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. XXII and art. XXVI, § 18; UTAH
CONST. art. III, para. 2; WASH. CONST. art. XXVI; WYo. CoNsT. art. 21, § 26.
14. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
15. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984)) (requiring Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over most of the Indian reservations within their
geographic boundaries and granting any other state the authority to assume jurisdiction over some
civil and criminal matters on Indian reservations within their geographic boarders) (see generally
Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 503 (1976)); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1995).
Likewise, United States Supreme Court decisions have granted states influence over tribal affairs.
Compare Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (permitting the State of
New Mexico to impose severance taxes on oil and gas leases on the Jicarilla Apache reservation)
with Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (rejecting the exercise of state jurisdiction to settle a
dispute over store credit).
16. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Public Law 280 to require tribal consent
before any other state could assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country. Robert N.
Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18
ARIZ. L. RaV. 503, 567 (1976). "To date, no such tribal consents have been secured." Id.
17. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1995).
18. IGRA specifies three types of classes of gaming. Class I gaming includes social or ceremonial
games; Class II gaming includes bingo and other similar games; and Class III gaming includes all
other forms of gaming, notably casino gaming and pari-mutuel horse racing. S. Rep. No. 446,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
19. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 566, 904 P.2d 11, 15 (1995).
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state governments to negotiate in good faith with the tribes regarding
which gaming activities will be permitted. 20 Thus, while IGRA granted

state governments the authority to enter into compacts with tribes, it
also commanded them to negotiate with the tribes.
State supreme courts, governors, and legislators have had varying reactions to the IGRA command to negotiate. Some states have challenged21
the authority of the United States Congress to make such a command,
while others have focused on the need for some state constitutional or
statutory source for that power. The New Mexico Supreme Court's recent
holding in Clark v. Johnson,22 and similar decisions by both federal and
state courts, focus on the question of who has the authority under state
constitutional and statutory law to negotiate compacts under the Federal
IGRA statute. 23 Those courts' search for a source of that power highlights

the need for a clear and permanent state structure to govern state relations
with their sovereign tribal neighbors.
This Comment will consider recent federal and state decisions that
analyze state constitutional authority for negotiating compacts under
IGRA. Legislative initiatives structuring the process of compacting under
IGRA and for other state-tribal agreements will be examined. The author
will then propose an amendment for state constitutions which would
govern these aspects of a state's relationship with its sister sovereigns,
the tribes. Finally, this Comment will discuss why a constitutional structure
for state-tribal relations is preferable to a statutory structure.

20. The Johnson court observed that
Congress enacted the IGRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). In Cabazon Band, the
Supreme Court upheld an Indian tribe's right to conduct bingo games free from
interference by the State of California. Id. The Cabazon Band decision rested on
the principle that Indian tribes are sovereign entities and that federal law limits
the applicability of state and local law to tribal Indians on reservations. Id. at 207.
The IGRA also recognized the sovereignty of tribes to regulate gaming activity on
Indian lands. However, with the IGRA, Congress attempted to strike a balance
between the rights of tribes as sovereigns and the interests that states may have in
regulating sophisticated forms of gambling. See S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1988).
120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15.
21. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
dismissed, 116 S.Ct. 435 (1995) (Indian tribes in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas filed suit
seeking to force those states to negotiate gaming compacts which the States argued was violative
of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Finney,
(Finney 1) 836 P.2d 1169, 1179-80 (Kan. 1992) (rejecting the Kansas Governor's argument that the
federal government could grant the governor power that she does not possess under the State
Constitution); Johnson, 120 N.M. at 562, 904 P.2d at 26 (stating confidence "that the United States
Supreme Court would reject any ... attempt by Congress to enlarge state gubernatorial power).
22. 120 N.M. 562, 567, 904 P.2d 11, 16 (1995).
23. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, C.A. No. 94-0619-T (D.R.I. January 20,
1995) (Memorandum and Order) (recognizing state constitutional law questions and certifying them
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court); Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd,
55 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding state-tribal compact legal under state statute and constitutional
under state constitution); Stephan v. Finney (Finney 1), 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992) (holding statetribal compact unconstitutional under state constitution).
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I. STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS' REACTIONS TO
UNILATERAL COMPACTING BY STATE GOVERNORS
Congress' IGRA command to states to negotiate in good faith failed
to define to whom, within a state government, that command was directed.24 Most likely, this void was created by congressional deference to
the states' independent authority to establish their own governmental
structure within the federal system. However, when the void was not
filled by a clear state constitutional provision or statutory scheme, it
could be filled by strong unilateral action by state governors. 25 Two state
supreme courts have faced the question of whether compacts unilaterally
negotiated and executed by a governor under IGRA were constitutional
under their respective state constitutions. 26 Similarly, a federal district
court in Mississippi considered the question with respect to the Mississippi
Constitution. 27 Most recently, the federal district court for the District
of Rhode Island considered a state constitutional challenge to compacts
entered into by that state's governor and then certified that question to
the state supreme court. 28 Each of these courts, faced with a state

24. See Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1179. "The only reference to a governor's function in connection
with IGRA is in 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(A) (1988) concerning gaming on lands acquired by a tribe
after October 17, 1988." Id. This provision requires a governor's concurrence with the Secretary
of the Interior's finding that gaming activity to be conducted within newly acquired land is not
detrimental to the surrounding communities.
25. The question of state authority to bind the state has stymied the federal government as well.
Although IGRA does not specify who may negotiate on behalf of the state, nor who may bind
the state to a compact, as these are state law issues, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt has
taken the consistent position that in determining if a compact is valid under state law, the Department
of Interior "must defer to the representation of Governors, as the Chief Executive Officers of their
states, unless it is clear beyond cavil that a Governor lacks the authority to sign a compact." Letter
from the Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, United States Department of the
Interior, to the Honorable Bill Richardson, United States Congressman, First District, New Mexico
(Apr. 5, 1995) (on file with author). See also Letter from the Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary
of the Interior, United States Department of the Interior, to the Honorable Jeff Bingaman, United
States Senator, New Mexico (Apr. 5, 1995) (on file with author); Letter from John D. Lesby,
Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, to the Honorable Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney
General, State of Rhode Island (Dec. 5, 1994) (on file with author) (stating that the Department
of the Interior does "not believe that Congress contemplated the Department would address or
resolve complex issues of State law raised by an integral State challenge to a Governor's authority"
under IGRA).
Interestingly, early Interior Department efforts to address this problem took the position that it
would defer to a state supreme court consideration of the state law issue. See Finney 1, 836 P.2d
at 1173-74 (noting that a February 28, 1992 letter from the Department of Interior to the Kickapoo
Nation stated that "departmental assessment on the issue of Governor Finney's authority to enter
into the compact will be deferred pending resolution of the court proceeding" and noting a March
13, 1992 letter from the Department of Interior to the Kickapoo Nation advised that the "(1)
[D]epartment will approve compact if the Kansas Supreme Court determines that 'the Governor is
authorized to bind the State to the compact'; [sic] and (2) the department considers the 45-day
period for approval specified in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8) will commence to run when the Kansas
Supreme Court's decision is issued." Id. at 1173-74.
26. See Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11 (1995); Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d
1169 (Kan. 1992).
27. See Willis v. Fordice, 850 F.Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd, 55 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995).
28. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, C.A. No. 94-0619-T, at I (D.R.I. 1995) (Memorandum and Order) The federal court certified "to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the question
of whether former Governor Sundlun had authority to execute [a gaming] compact [with the
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constitution that lacked any clear structure governing state-tribal relain the broader context
tionships, placed the question of constitutionality
29
of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Kansas Case: Stephan v. Finney
Confusion created by the conflict between the IGRA command to states
to negotiate with Indian tribes, and the lack of any state structure for
such negotiations, first came to a head in Stephan v. Finney (Finney
)30 In that case, the Kansas Attorney General challenged "the authority
of the Governor of Kansas to negotiate and enter into a binding tribalstate compact under . . . IGRA" after Governor Finney entered into a
tribal-state compact with the Kickapoo Nation. 3 Although there were a
variety of attempts by the Kansas legislature to design a structure for
compacting under IGRA prior to the filing of Finney I, no legislative
solution was produced before the court considered the action.32
In Finney I, the Governor argued that her authority to bind the State
of Kansas arose from constitutional, statutory, and policy sources. Governor Finney relied on the Kansas Constitution, specific statutory provisions, and expediency arguments to buttress her contention that she
had the authority to bind the state in a compact negotiated under IGRA.
First, she cited Article 1, Section 3 of the Kansas Constitution, which
grants her the supreme executive power of the state as the constitutional
source of her authority. 33 Second, she noted that Section 75-107 of the
Kansas Statutes gives the governor the authority to "transact all the

A.

Narragansett Tribe] on behalf of the State." Id. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island answereil
this question by holding that the Governor had acted without statutory or constitutional authority.
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1995).
29. No state constitution explicitly defines the state's relationship with Indian Nations. In fact,
few even mention Indians or tribes other than in their Enabling Acts. Other state constitutional
references to Indians range from the hostile to the deferential. See, e.g., TEx. CoNsT. art. IV, § 7
("[the governor] shall have the power to call forth the militia . . . to suppress insurrections, repel
invasions, and protect the frontier from hostile incursions by Indians or other predatory bands.");
MONT. CoNsT. art. X, § 1(1) (recognizing "the distinct and unique cultural heritage of the American
Indians and [the state's commitment] in its educational goals to the preservation of their cultural
integrity."). However, these additional references were few and none established or significantly
influenced tribal-state relations.
30. 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992).
31. Id. at 1170. The Attorney General's suit followed the introduction of a Kansas House
Concurrent Resolution on January 24, 1992, urging the "Secretary of [the] Interior to withhold
approval of [the] compact because the Kansas Legislature's approval thereof is required and the
same [was] not . . . secured. (Bill died January 27, 1992)." Id. at 1173-74.
32. As the Finney I court noted, on February 11, 1992, "House Bill No. 2928 introduced in
Kansas Legislature which would [have] authorize[d the] governor or her designated representative
to negotiate tribal-state compacts and to sign same on behalf of the State. [The] Attorney General
[was] designated as [the] governor's legal counsel in such negotiations. (Bill died in committee May
26, 1992)." Then on February 25, 1992, "Senate Bill No. 739 introduced which would [have]
create[d] the Kansas Legislative Commission on State-Indian Affairs which would [have been] charged
with negotiation of tribal-state compacts. (Bill died in committee, May 26, 1992.)." 836 P.2d at
1173-74.
33. Id. at 1178.
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business of the state, civil and military, with the general government,3 4
except in cases otherwise specially provided by law." ' 35 She argued that,
taken together, these sources gave her the power to bind the state in a
gaming compact. Finally, the Governor argued that from a policy perspective, it was "neither practical nor feasible for the legislature 36 to
negotiate .

.

. or execute .

.

. such compacts .

.

. and that [because of

the time limitations contained in IGRA,] expediency requires that the
governor be held to have the authority to act on behalf of the State in
IGRA matters." 37
The Finney I court rejected the Governor's reading of IGRA, holding
instead that IGRA only granted the governor the authority to implement
previously established law or public policy, not to enact law or determine
public policy.3" Furthermore, the court rejected other proposed statutory
sources of the governor's authority to negotiate and execute compacts
with the tribes,3 9 concluding that the state legislature had "enacted no
legislation authorizing the Governor to negotiate ... compact[s which
would] . .. bind the State."' 4 Moreover, the court rejected the Governor's
argument that IGRA "requires that the Governor act on behalf of the
State in negotiating tribal-state compacts and binding the State thereto. ' 41
Having dismissed the possibility of a statutory or other source for the
governor's power, the court in Finney I then considered whether the

34. The general government referenced in the statute is the government of the United States.
The Governor argued that "the negotiation of tribal-state compacts under IGRA is a matter of
federal law," and therefore, the Kansas statute authorizes the governor to conduct this federal
business. Id.
35. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-107 (1989).
36. The Governor argued that the legislature is unsuited for conducting IGRA negotiations
because "(1) The legislature is only in session a small percentage of the year; and (2) by its very
nature, the legislature is wholly unsuited to the negotiation process." Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1178.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.at 1178-79. Other statutory sources of power that Governor Finney relied on included
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-106 (1989), which requires that the Governor sign all proclamations
warrants
and requisitions, and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-925 (1994), which gives the governor certain powers
during a state of disaster emergency. See Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1178.
40. Id. at 1179.
41. Id. Moreover, the court rejected the Governor's argument that the "retrocession cases" urged
a finding that IGRA gave the Governor's action (with the Secretary of the Interior's approval) the
force of federal law preempting any state law-irrespective of the validity of the governor's action
under state law. Id. at 1180. The "retrocession cases" were a series of federal district court cases,
which grew out of 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988). Section 1323 "authorized the United States to accept
retrocession by any state of all or any part of the jurisdiction acquired by Public Law 83-280."
Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1180. The "retrocession cases" were filed by parties seeking to invalidate
retrocessions that had been accepted by the Secretary of the Interior, on the grounds that they
were invalid under state law. Id. These cases concluded that "[t]he federal government, having the
power to preempt jurisdiction over [Indian Reservations], had the power to so define and construe
the word 'retrocession' as to remove from the determination of federal assumption of jurisdiction
any question of the procedural validity or invalidity of the state's act of retrocession." United
States v. Brown, 334 F.Supp. 536, 540-41 (D. Neb. 1971). While agreeing with the federal district
court's analysis in the "retrocession cases," the Finney I court held that the same analysis was not
applicable under IGRA as the proposed compact would not be giving up jurisdiction but would
rather be establishing state law. 836 P.2d at 1181. Additionally, the court noted that the issue in
Finney I was whether the governor had the authority to bind the state, not "the propriety of [the
Secretary of the Interior's] future act of approval or disapproval." Id.
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Kansas Constitution provided the governor with the authority to bind
the state in a compact with an Indian tribe. 42 First, the court discussed
the separation of powers doctrine, 43 and noted that under the Kansas
Constitution, the authority to execute and enforce the laws is delegated
to the governor, while the power to make laws is delegated to the
legislature." "Thus, a dangerous concentration of power is avoided through
the checks and balances each branch of government has against the
other. ' 45 The court then considered the terms of the compact and noted
that it created a "State Gaming Agency" and established the rules it
would abide by and the actions it could take."6
The compact would thus create a State Gaming Agency. Such agency
does not now exist and has never been authorized by the legislature.
The duties undertaken will require the hiring, training, and supervision
has not authorized such and
of new state employees. The legislature
47
the same has not been budgeted.
The court therefore held that the compact would, in effect, create a state
agency under the auspices of the executive. "The creation of a state
agency is clearly a legislative function and cannot be accomplished by
the guise of merely adding a new function
the executive branch under
4' 8
agency."
to an existing
Having concluded that the Kansas Constitution does not grant the
governor authority to bind the state in a compact with an Indian nation,
the court turned to the Governor's final argument: expediency. Expediency, as the court noted however, "cannot grant a power to the executive
branch which the Kansas Constitution has denied it." 49 Thus, the Finney
I court concluded that while "the Governor had the authority to enter
into negotiations with the Kickapoo Nation .

.

. in the absence of an

appropriate delegation of power by the Kansas Legislature or legislative

42. Id. at 1181.
43. Id. "Like the Constitution of the United States, the Kansas Constitution contains no express
provision establishing the doctrine of separation of powers. However, it has been recognized that
the very structure of the three-branch system of governing gives rise to the doctrine." Id. (quoting
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Rep., 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984)).
44. Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1181 (citing KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3; and KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 1).
45. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Rep., 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984).
46. Id. at 1182 (citing Compact, §§ 4 and 7).
47. Id.at 1183.
48. Id. at 1184-85. The court noted other provisions in the compact which it held were also
legislative in function. These included: § 9(1) of the Compact which required the Kansas Bureau
of Investigation to do background investigations on gaming employees and provide reports on the
employees to the tribe- which, the court noted may be violative of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4707
(1988), which prohibits the dissemination of such information to any but certain enumerated agencies;
and § 4(q) of the Compact which requires tribal law enforcement officers to attend the Kansas Law
Enforcement Training Center, thus authorizing the expenditure of state funds. The court noted that
state funds that were expended in accordance with these provisions were to be reimbursed by the
tribe under the compact. However, the court found that the reimbursement did not relieve the
inherent constitutional problem created by the reversing of legislative and executive functions. Finney
1, 863 P.2d at 1184-85.
49. Id. at 1185.
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approval of the compact,
the Governor has no power to bind the State
50
to the terms thereof.

B.

The New Mexico Case: Clark v. Johnson
Soon after New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson was elected in November of 1994, he began negotiations with various tribal leaders to
develop gaming compacts and revenue-sharing agreements under the
IGRA. 5' The Governor released a copy of a proposed compact and
revenue-sharing agreement on February 7, 1995A2 On February 9, the
Governor agreed to allow enough time for public and legislative comment
before he signed the proposed compact. 3 Despite "his public assurances
that he would not sign the compact until further review and negotiation
had occurred, on February 13, 1995 the Governor signed the compact
.... , Several legislators and litigants generally opposed to gaming sued
to "preclude the Governor ... from implementing the compacts and
revenue-sharing agreements."" The petitioners argued that the Governor
"lacked the authority to commit New Mexico to . . . [the] compacts and
agreements, because he [was] attempt[ing] to exercise legislative authority
contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers expressed in the state
Constitution.' '56
Governor Johnson, like his Kansas counterpart, relied on constitutional
and statutory provisions as the source of his authority to commit the
state to compacts with Indian tribes. Specifically, the Governor argued
that Article V, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution granted him
"[t]he supreme executive power of the state," thus vesting him with the
authority to execute the gaming compacts." Moreover, the Governor cited
;statutory authority for this proposition. For example, the Governor
argued
that the Joint Powers Agreements Act

8

"authorizes any two or more

public agencies by agreement to jointly exercise any power common to
the contracting parties;" and, as the Act defines a. "public agency" to
include Indian tribes and any state department, the Act therefore gives
the executive agencies the authority to contract agreements between the
state and the tribes.5 9 Likewise, the Governor argued that, because the
Mutual Aid Act 6° grants the State the authority to enter into law enforcement mutual aid agreements with Indian Tribes, he had similar
authority to enter into the gaming compacts . 6

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
See Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 567, 904 P.2d 11, 16 (1995).
H.R.J. Res. 11, 42d Leg., 1st Sess., 1995 N.M. Laws I.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Johnson, 120 N.M. at 566, 904 P.2d at 15.
Id. (citing N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1).
Johnson, 120 N.M. at 568, 904 P.2d at 17.

58. N.M. STAT. ANN.

§§ 11-1-1 to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).

59. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 568, 904 P.2d at 17.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-8-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
61. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 568, 904 P.2d at 17.
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In Johnson, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the governor's
constitutional and statutory arguments in light of the New Mexico Constitution's explicit separation of powers. 62 This doctrine, "rests on the
notion that the accumulation of too much power in one governmental
entity presents a threat to liberty." ' 63 It was this potential imbalance in
64
power that was the court's concern in Johnson. Noting that the legislature
creates the law, while the governor executes it, the court explained that
[i]f the entry into the compacts reasonably can be viewed as the
execution of law, we would have no difficulty recognizing the attempt
as within the Governor's authority as the State's chief executive officer.
If, on the other hand, his actions in fact conflict with or infringe
making of lawupon what is the essence of legislative authority-the
65
then the Governor has exceeded his authority.
In considering whether the signing of the compact infringed on the
lawmaking power constitutionally granted to the legislature, the court66
noted that the question is not whether the compact creates new law,
the proper balance
but rather "whether the Governor's action disrupts
' 67
branches.
legislative
and
executive
the
between
Analyzing the terms of the tribal-state compact, the court noted that
it gave the Tribe "a virtually irrevocable and seemingly perpetual right
to conduct any form of Class III gaming permitted in New Mexico on
"legthe date the Governor signed the agreement," thereby foreclosing
' 68 Thus,
is
undisputed.
authority
legislative
where
areas
in
islative action
the court found that the Governor's action was disruptive of the legislature's authority because, even "legislative change could not affect the
Tribe's ability to conduct Class III gaming authorized under the original
compact." 69 Moreover, if the legislature makes any attempt to restrict
Indian gaming, the Tribe's obligation to make payments under the revenue0
sharing agreement would be terminated. Thus, the court held that the
Governor's action in executing the compacts violated the separation of

62. N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall*
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
63. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22.
64. Id. (citing State v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 36 N.M. 151, 153, 9 P.2d 691, 692 (1932)).
65. Id.
66. The Jo'hnson court noted that "upon approval by Congress, a compact between states
becomes federal law that binds the states." Id. at 22-23 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
554, 564 (1983)). The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court has characterized
"interstate compact[s] as a 'legislative means' by which states resolve interstate dispute[s]." Johnson
120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23. (citing West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28
(1951)).
67. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
68. Id. (citing Compact Between the Pojoaque Pueblo and the State of New Mexico, at 4).
69. Id. at 574, 904 P.2d at 23.
5(A)).
70. Id. (citing Tribal-State Revenue Sharing Agreement,
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powers provision of the New Mexico Constitution and was therefore
un6onstitutional:
The legislature of this state has unequivocally expressed a public policy
against unrestricted gaming, and the Governor has taken a course
contrary to that expressed policy .... Further, even if our laws
allowed under some circumstances what the compact terms "casinostyle" gaming, we conclude that the Governor of New Mexico negotiated and executed a tribal-state compact that exceeded his authority
71
as chief executive officer.
The Johnson court also rejected the governor's reliance on the statutory
authority cited in the compacts. First, the court noted that the Joint
Powers Agreement Act, while permitting agreements between the state
and sovereign Indian tribes, "expressly requires that such an agreement
must be 'authorized by [the public agency's] legislative or other governing
bod[y]. ' ' 72 Thus, the court held that the statute "plainly mandates that
the legislature must approve any agreement to which the State is a party." ' 7
Likewise, the court rejected the Governor's contention that the Mutual
Aid Act provides the governor with authority to enter into compacts
under IGRA. 74 The court noted that. the Act is "confined to 'agreements
with respect to law enforcement,"' and that it "does not in any
way pertain to gaming compacts," nor does it provide any statutory
basis for the governor's unilateral action. 71
Congress, by enacting IGRA, intended to give the states a role in
determining what Class III gaming would be permitted on tribal lands. 76
Thus, IGRA provides, "[a]ny State . . . may enter into a Tribal-State
compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian
Tribe." ' 77 As the Johnson court observed,
[tihe only reasonable interpretation of this language is that it authorizes
state officials, acting pursuant to their authority held under state law,
to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state. It follows that
because the Governor lacked authority under New Mexico law to
enter into the compact with Pojoaque Pueblo [and other tribes], the
State of New Mexico has not yet entered into any gaming compact
that the Governor may implement. 7
In other words, the court found that because the Governor's unilateral
action (executing the purported compact) had no state statutory source
and violated New Mexico's constitution, it was not a valid compact under
79
IGRA.

71. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 572, 904 P.2d at 21.
72. Id. at 576, 904 P.2d at 25 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-1-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (brackets
and internal quotations in original)).
73. Id.
74. See Johnson, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26.
75. Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-8-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994)).
76. See id.
77. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
78. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 577, 904 P.2d at 26.
79. See id.See also supra note 20.
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0
C. A Federal Court's Perspective: Willis v. Fordice
In December of 1992, the Governor of Mississippi entered into a
compact with Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians to permit Class III
8
gaming on tribal lands under IGRA. ' In accordance with IGRA, the
Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on January 15,
1993.82 Brantley Willis, a member of the Choctaw tribe, filed suit in the
federal district court, seeking "to have the Compact declared void alleging
that [Governor] Fordice did not have the authority to enter into the
Compact on behalf of the State of Mississippi.''83
Although the Fordice court found that the plaintiff, as a disaffected
member of the Choctaw tribe, lacked standing to prosecute the action,
it nonetheless determined that the Compact was valid under state law
and IGRA.84 While addressing the plaintiff's central argument, the court
ignored the underlying constitutional question and held that the Governor
85
was acting with state statutory authority. Specifically, the court found
that the governor had acted under a Mississippi statute that grants the
state governor the authority to "transact all the business of the state,
civil and military, with the United States government or with any other
by law. ' 8 6
state or territory, except in cases otherwise specially provided
The Fordice court accepted the Mississippi Governor's contention that
the statute, which authorizes the governor to transact business with other
7
states, territories, or the federal government, is precisely what Congress
mechcontemplated when it chose the compacting provision as "the best
88s Noting
met."
are
sovereigns
anism to assure that the interests of both

80. Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523, 524 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd, 55 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.
1995).
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 525.
84. Id. at 530. In analyzing the plaintiff's arguments about IGRA, the court examined the
purpose behind the statute's compacting provisions. Quoting extensively from the report on the
Senate hearings on IGRA, the court noted that Congress intended the statute to balance "the strong
concerns of states that state laws and regulations relating to sophisticated forms of Class III gaming
be respected on Indian lands where, with few exceptions such laws ... do not now apply." Id.
at 532 (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1990)(emphasis
in original)(citation omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991)). Moreover, the report suggests that
Congress "balanced these concerns against the strong tribal opposition to any imposition of State
jurisdiction over activities on Indian lands, [thus] . . .the compact process [was viewed as] a viable
mechanism for setting [sic] various matters between two equal sovereigns." Fordice, 850 F. Supp.
at 532.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-1-13 (1991)).
87. Notably, the United States Supreme Court has held that an Indian tribe is neither a state
nor a territory. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). See also McClannahan
v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973) (Indian tribes "were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations;
not as States, not as nations"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). It is possible
that under Mississippi law, a sovereign tribe would be included in the scope of this statute, however,
the statute specifically names the governments that the governor can negotiate with, and that list
does not include any reference to Indian nations, nor does it use any generic term such as "sovereign
entities." See Mtss. CODE ANN. § 7-1-13.
88. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. at 532 (quoting Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d
1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991)).
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that IGRA does not require a particular branch of the state government
to conduct negotiations with the Indian tribes, and relying on the statute
permitting the governor to transact business with any other state or
territory, the court held that the compact was valid under IGRA and
Mississippi state law.8 9
D. Federal Courts and State Constitutional Questions: Rhode Island
v. Narragansett Indian Tribe9O
The governor of Rhode Island, shortly before losing his bid for reelection in 1994, and "purporting to act on behalf of the State, executed
what he and the [Narragansett] Tribe contend[ed was] a Tribal-State
compact." 91 Ignoring arguments by the Attorney General of Rhode Island 92
that Governor Sundlun did not have the authority under the state's
constitution to execute the compact with the tribe, the Secretary of the
Interior approved the compact under the provisions of IGRA.93 The
Attorney General then filed suit in federal district court, challenging the
compact under IGRA and on state law grounds. 94
The Narragansettcourt observed that the threshold question was whether
the Governor had the "authority to execute the compact on behalf of
the 'State' 95 For, "[i]f the Governor did not have authority to bind
the State, there would be no need to address any other issues because
the compact would be a nullity."' 6 After considering the effect of the

89. Id. at 532-33. The Mississippi statute has remarkably similar language to the statute Kansas
Governor Finney relied on in Finney I. The most significant difference between the Mississippi
and
Kansas statutes is that the Kansas governor is only permitted to "transact all the business
of the
state" with the federal government, while the Mississippi statute explicitly permits the governor
to
"transact business" with other states and territories. Finney I, 836 P.2d at 1178. The Fordice
court
did not examine the meaning of the phrase "transact business" nor did it address the underlying
state separation of powers question. 850 F. Supp. at 523.
The Finney I court held that "the transaction of business connotes the day-to-day operation
of
government under previously established law or public policy" and therefore held that the
Kansas
statute did not reach so far as to grant the Governor the authority to bind the state. 836 P.2d
at
1178. Moreover, the Finney I court noted that even if the statute was intended to grant such
powers
to the governor, then it could likely be "challenged on grounds that it constitutes an impermissible
delegation of the legislature's law-making powers." Id. Had the court in Fordice considered
the
meaning of "transact business" in the Mississippi statute, it may not have construed the statute
to
grant the state's governor the authority to bind the state in gaming compacts. More fundamentally,
if the statute does grant the governor such authority, it may constitute "an impermissible delegation
of the legislature's law-making powers," id. under the Mississippi constitution. The Fordice
court
did not cite any state case law interpreting the scope of Section 7-1-13 of the Mississippi
Code
Annotated or any cases analyzing its constitutionality.
90. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, C.A. No. 94-0619-T at 3 (D.R.I. 1995) (Memorandum and Order).
91. Id.
92. See Letter from John D. Lesby, Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, to
the
Honorable Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General, State of Rhode Island (Dec. 5, 1994) (on file
with
author).
93. See Notice of Approved Tribal-State Compact, 59 Fed. Reg. 65065 (1994) (notice dated
Dec.
5, 1994).
94. See Narragansett, C.A. No. 94-0619-T, at 3.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
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Secretary's approval, 97 the court determined that the Governor's "authority to act on behalf of the State cannot be determined by reference
9
to IGRA, [but must instead] be determined by reference to state law."
However, the court noted that when "state law is unclear, principles of
federalism and comity counsel that the highest court of the state should
be given an opportunity to decide what the state's own law provides."9
Recognizing that questions related to the allocation of state powers among
its elected officials are fundamental to state self-government, the court
determined that the proper forum for resolution of the state law issues
l
was the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. '0 Therefore, it certified those
0
questions to that court.' '
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled in response to the federal
court's certified question that the governor lacked both statutory and
0 2
constitutional authority to execute a tribal-state compact unilaterally.
The court based its ruling on the state constitution's grant to the General
03
Assembly of exclusive authority over all lotteries' and the constitution's
reservation of all powers not explicitly delegated to the governor in the
General Assembly.' °4 While the court recognized the state constitution
established the General Assembly as the reservoir of all non-delegated
state authority and that the governor could only exercise those limited
powers explicitly delegated to the executive, the court took "care to note
that [its] opinion in no way suggests that the Governor, in his capacity
as Chief Executive Officer of this state, lacks the authority to advocate,
0 5
to initiate, and to negotiate, short of executing, a tribal-state compact.'
IGRA and the Balance of State Power
It is clear that the IGRA command to states to negotiate with their
tribal neighbors creates serious state law questions. While the partial
delegation of federal power to the states is not new, the requirement to
negotiate compacts has no counterpart. No state constitution directly
addresses how such activity is to be conducted, nor who has the authority
to conduct it. The fundamental question of how this authority is to be
distributed among the three branches of each state government must be
answered definitively before stable compacts can be implemented.
E.

97. See id. (rejecting the tribe's argument the Secretary's approval made the compact federal
law).
98. Id.
99. Id. The court also observed that when state law is clear, federal courts can and should
resolve the issue. See id. Interestingly, the court cited Fordice in support of this proposition. See
id.
100. Narragansett, C.A. No. 94-0619-T at 8.
101. Id. at 9. Certification of questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court by federal courts
is permitted under Rule 6 of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1995).
102. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 667 A.2d at 282.
103. See R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
104. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 667 A.2d at 282.
105. Id.
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STATUTORY COMPACTING PROVISIONS

Although unilateral gubernatorial action has resulted in strong protests
and swift declarations of unconstitutional usurpation of legislative prerogatives by the state supreme courts in New Mexico, Kansas, and Rhode
Island, some state legislatures have actively encouraged governors to take
control of compacting under IGRA.' °6 Other states have set up special
boards to negotiate and execute compacts, or have granted that authority
to pre-existing agencies. 107 Finally, some state legislatures, recognizing the
separation of powers issues emphasized by the New Mexico and Kansas
Supreme Courts, have considered or established statutory structures which
involve the legislatures in the compacting process. 08 While each of these
three approaches has provided some structure to state compacting processes under IGRA, none of them has taken a comprehensive approach
to state-tribal relations. Moreover, many of these statutes fail to adequately
consider the separation of powers issues highlighted in the cases discussed
above.
A.

Statutory Authority Permitting the Governor to Negotiate and
Bind the State in a Compact

1. Nebraska's Broad Grant of Power
One of the broadest grants of power to a state executive by a state
legislature in reaction to IGRA may be the authority granted by the
Nebraska Legislature to the state's governor. 1°9 Section 9-1, 106 of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes grants the governor the authority to execute
a compact "without ratification by the Legislature."1
Although the
statute states that "[i]t shall be the policy of this state that any compact
negotiated pursuant to this section shall (a) protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the public and (b) promote tribal economic development,
tribal self sufficiency, and strong tribal government,""' the language of
section 1 indicates that the legislature intended to give the governor
exclusive authority to bind the state to compacts under IGRA.
It is not clear whether the Nebraska legislature considered separationof-powers issues when it enacted this statute. Such an analysis is critical

106. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-601 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 67-429A (Supp. 1994);
(Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-4-25 (1992); Wis. STAT.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-1, 106
ANN. § 14.035 (Supp. 1995).

107. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19445 (Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-586f
(1993); H.R. 41, 41st Leg., 1993 N.M. Laws, at 88BB.
108. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-2301 through 2304 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.46.360
(Supp. 1996).
109. See NEB. REV. ST. § 9-1, 106 (Supp. 1994); accord Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.035 (1995). Under
the Wisconsin statute, "[t]he governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that
has been negotiated under 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.035 (1995). The legislature
also created a Indian Gaming Commission to assist the governor in entering into compacts and to
act as a liaison between the tribes and the state. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 569.02 (Supp. 1995).
110. NEB. REv. ST. § 9-1, 106(1) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
111. Id. § 9-1, 106(2)
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to determine if the act is constitutional under the Nebraska Constitution.
The constitutionality of the compacting statute's broad delegation of
legislative authority necessarily comes into question under the explicit
separation of 2 Nebraska's three branches of government in the state's
constitution. ,"
The Nebraska Supreme Court has observed that the state constitution's
separation of powers provision is much more rigorous than the federal
separation of powers doctrine." 3 The court in Nebraska v. Philips"4 noted
that while the federal doctrine has been construed to permit significant
overlapping of responsibility between the federal branches," 5 the Nebraska
Constitution explicitly "prohibits one department of government from
encroaching on the duties and prerogatives of the others or from improperly delegating its own duties and prerogatives, except as the Constitution itself otherwise directs or permits."" 6 This language would suggest
that without an express constitutional provision, the legislature cannot
delegate its authority to the executive or judicial branches.
Much of the litigation over this constitutional provision has addressed
separation of powers issues between the state's judicial and legislative
branches ' 7 and between the judicial and executive branches.'" While the
Nebraska Supreme Court has approved the grant of authority to executive
agencies to promulgate rules and regulations," 9 it has clearly distinguished
this from the delegation of law-making authority. 20 In Clemens v. Harvey, 2 '
the court held that an agency's "decision to exclude an entire class of
persons from [a] . . . medical assistance program was a legislative act,"
and was therefore void under the separation-of-powers provision in the
Nebraska Constitution. 122 These decisions seem to suggest that the legislature's broad delegation of compacting authority could be construed

112. See NEB. CONST. art. II, § I (expressly requiring the separation of the powers of the three
branches of state government).
113. See Nebraska v. Philips, 521 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Neb. 1994).
114. Id.
115. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (noting that the federal separation of
powers doctrine can be inferred from the overall constitutional structure, not one particular provision
therein).
116. Philips, 521 N.W.2d at 916.
117. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 4 N.W.2d 302 (Neb. 1942) (holding that judiciary
does not have to accept lower standards for admission to the bar as set by statute as to do so
would violate separation of powers); McDonald v. Rentfrow, 127 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1964) (holding
that the state legislature may not impose legislative functions upon the judicial branch); Williams
v. County of Buffalo, 147 N.W.2d 776 (Neb. 1967) (striking down an act granting courts the power
to determine which lands should be annexed to a city).
118. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Philips, 521 N.W.2d 913 (Neb. 1994) (holding that resentencing statute
violated the state constitution's separation of powers clause by attempting to grant executive commutation power to the judiciary); Nebraska v. Jones, 532 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 1995) (striking down
statute that granted executive commutation power to the judiciary).
119. Clemens v. Harvey, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Neb. 1994) (recognizing executive agency's "general
authority to promulgate medical assistance rules and regulations").
120. Id. (holding that regulation eliminating benefits under the Nebraska medical assistance program
was a legislative act, which agency did not have authority to do).
121. 525 N.W.2d 185 (Neb. 1994).
122. Id. at 189.
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as a delegation of legislative authority, and may therefore be unconsti-

tutional under the Nebraska Constitution's separation of powers clause.

2. Arizona's Conditional Grant of Power
The Arizona legislature appears to grant the governor of Arizona
authority as sweeping as that of the governor of Nebraska to negotiate
compacts under IGRA. 23 However, it went on to place specific and

enforceable restrictions on the governor's authority to enter into tribalstate compacts:
Notwithstanding The authority granted to the governor by this subsection, this state specifically reserves all of its rights, as attributes
of its inherent sovereignty, recognized by the tenth and eleventh
amendments to the United States Constitution. The governor shall
not execute a tribal-state
compact which waives, abrogates or dimin24

ishes these rights.
Moreover, section 5-601(B) prohibits the governor from concurring with
the Secretary of the Interior in any determination that would permit
gaming on any lands acquired by any tribe after October 17, 1988.125
The statute also requires the agency authorized to carry out the state's
responsibilities under the statute to adopt regulations consistent with the
tribal-state compacts "to ensure the integrity and honesty of gaming
activities authorized by a tribal-state compact and to promote tribal
26
economic development."
Finally, and most significantly, the statute explicitly controls the governor's authority to compact-and constrains the sovereignty of any
compacting tribe-by requiring that every compact include a provision
that would require the compacting tribe to "pay to the Arizona department
of racing their share of the regulatory costs necessary to carry out the
duties required by any executed tribal state compact authorized by
[IGRA].'

127

Although the statute provides that the "dates and methods

123. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this state through the governor, may enter
into negotiations and execute tribal-state compacts with Indian tribes in this state pursuant to the
Indian gaming regulatory act of 1988 [sic]." ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-601(A); accord S.D. STAT.
ANN. § 1-4-25. The South Dakota statute granting the governor the authority to negotiate and
execute compacts under IGRA appears to be equally as broad. Like its Arizona counterpart, the
South Dakota statute places various restrictions on the governor's authority. It requires "the Governor
or his designee [to] hold one or more public hearings in the affected area to allow any interested
persons to state their views" before entering into a tribal-state compact. S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 1-4-25. Moreover, in creating a Gaming Commission, the legislature required that the cost of the
performance of any duties imposed on the state be funded "by payments made available to the
commission under the compact." Id. Thus, the legislature did put some conditions on the governor's
authority to negotiate and execute tribal-state compacts, and used its legislative authority to restrict
the state's ability to comply with the terms of those compacts.
124. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5.601(A) (Cum. Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
125. See id. § 5-601(B). Although this is a vague restriction on the governor's authority to compact
under the statute, it is a good example of the legislature's apparent intent to set permanent policy
for the governor's compacting decisions.
126. Id. § 5-601(C), (D).
127. Id. § 5-601(E). Thus, the statute ensures half of the funding for any costs that are created
by the compact. However, it does not make it clear whether the compact would bind the state to
pay its share of the costs, thereby permitting the governor to "act legislatively."
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the

legislature clearly restricted the governor's authority to compact with the
tribes 129 and placed statutory controls on some of the terms of tribalstate compacts.
Despite the Arizona restrictions on the governor's authority to compact
with Indian tribes, separation-of-powers issues may arise when the governor of Arizona evokes his or her authority under this statute. The
Arizona Constitution contains an explicit separation-of-powers provision,
much like the New Mexico and Nebraska provisions., 3 0 While the Arizona
courts have found that the line between what a constitutional and an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority is "dim,"'' and that
the Legislature may not delegate its power to make laws, 3 2 they have
nonetheless recognized that "where the legislature declares policies and
fixes primary standards by statute, it may validly confer on administrative
officers power to fill in details by prescribing rules to promote the spirit
of the legislation in its complete operation."' 3 Thus, under the Arizona
Constitution's separation-of-powers provision, the question for the Arizona courts is whether the compacting statute has impermissibly delegated
legislative authority to the governor, or has set out guidelines specific
enough to overcome this constitutional hurdle. Given the broad grant of
authority to compact within vague considerations of the state's sovereignty,
and the apparent authority to bind the state to expend funds to cover
the costs of implementing the compact, it appears that this will be a
high hurdle to overcome.
Separation-of-Powers Concerns Under Broad Grants of
Compacting Power
34
Given the Arizona state legislature's emphasis on state sovereignty,
Indian nations considering entering into compacts with Arizona may want
to examine what safeguards exist to protect the terms of tribal-state
compacts. It is not yet clear whether either the Nebraska or Arizona
legislature is free to invalidate particular provisions of their compacts.
Moreover, tribes considering compacting with states that grant exclusive
or nearly exclusive authority to their governors to execute tribal-state
compacts may also want to consider the impact of future state consti3.

128. Id.
129. See supra note 123 for a discussion of a comparable provision in the South Dakota statue
authorizing the state's governor to execute compacts under IGRA.
130. See ARIZ. CONST. art. III.
131. See Arizona v. Phelps, 467 P.2d 923 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
132. Lake Havasu City v. Mohave County, 675 P.2d 1371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
133. Cohen v. Arizona, 588 P.2d 313, 319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), adopted in part, vacated in
part, 588 P.2d 299 (Ariz. 1978). See also Duncan v. A.R. Krull Co., 114 P.2d 888, 890 (Ariz.
1941) (holding that "[so] long as policy is laid down and a standard is established by a statute,
no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved"); Arizona v. Arizona Mines Supply
Co., 484 P.2d 619 (Ariz. 1971) (holding that the legislature may not completely delegate its authority
to another body but may grant a large portion of that authority to administer a specific statute).
134. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-601(A) (noting the state's "inherent sovereignty").
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tutional rulings based on their separation-of-powers clauses. These broad
and poorly structured statutes leave the compacts executed under them
in doubt.
B.

Compacting Through Special Boards
As an alternative to granting the governor exclusive authority to execute
tribal-state compacts, some states have created a special board or put a
particular state agency in charge of compacting with tribes (or at least,
given them some influence over the compacting process). This procedure
has the advantage of ensuring that the expertise of specialized agencies
will be utilized in the compacting process; however, these agencies add
an additional layer of complexity in the compacting process.
1. The Aborted New Mexico Proposal
Ironically, in 1993 under Governor Bruce King's administration, the
New Mexico legislature passed and sent to the governor a proposal to
give full compacting authority to an executive agency, the Office of
Indian Affairs. 3 However, influenced by his strong stance against Indian
gaming, Governor King vetoed the measure. 3 6 Presumably, had the bill
become law, the New Mexico Supreme Court would have faced similar
separation of powers concerns as they did in Clark v. Johnson.'3 7 The
bill delegated to the executive Office of Indian Affairs "the exclusive
38
authority, to negotiate and execute compacts on behalf of the state."'
Had the legislature required a ratification procedure for the compacts,
or had the legislature created guidelines as the Arizona legislature did,
this delegation of legislative authority may have proved palatable to the
39
state supreme court.

135. H.B. 41, 41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1993). The Bill read as follows:
Section 1. TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS-GAMING ACTIVITIES-EXCLUSIVE
AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND EXECUTE COMPACTS VESTED IN THE
NEW MEXICO OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.-The New Mexico office of
Indian affairs shall have exclusive authority to negotiate and execute compacts on
behalf of the state, with regard to class 3 [sic] gaming activities on Indian lands,
pursuant to the provisions of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
Id.
136. In his Veto Message, Governor King noted that the bill would have delegated the exclusive
authority to negotiate and execute compacts on behalf of the State to the New Mexico Office of
Indian Affairs. The Governor explained his veto by observing that the "issue of the type of Indian
gaming which should be permitted on Indian lands is a question which is now in the courts," and
concluding that "[tihis matter is best left to the courts and the elected representatives of this state."
House Executive Message No. 39, Veto Messages of Governor Bruce King, 41st Leg., 1st Sess.
(1993).
137. 120 N.M. 562, 575, 904 P.2d 11, 24 (1995).
138. H.B. 41, 41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
139. The Johnson court observed that under Justice Jackson's analysis in his famous concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)(Jackson, J., concurring),
the governor's power to compact was at its lowest ebb. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at
24. In Youngstown, the Supreme Court "faced the issue of whether President Truman had exceeded
his constitutional authority by issuing an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to
assume control of a number of steel mills." Johnson, 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24. Justice
Jackson argued that "when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

2. California's Multiple Specialized-Board Approach
California established several legislative schemes like the one proposed
by the New Mexico legislature. For example, the California state legislature
designated the State Horse Racing Board as the "state entity responsible
for negotiating with an Indian tribe pursuant to [IGRA] for the purpose
of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of horse
racing activities on the Indian Lands of the tribe.' 140 Unlike the New
Mexico statute and the broad grants of compacting authority under the
Nebraska and Arizona statutes, California has limited the Board's authority, by only granting the Board the authority to negotiate a "compact
conduct of horseracing activities on the Indian lands of
governing the
14
the tribe.'" '
Interestingly, the California legislature has not been limited by the
strictures of IGRA. It has granted authority to the California Department
of Fish and Game to negotiate compacts with specific Indian nations
that are well beyond the scope of IGRA. 142 The legislature has also
granted the Department of Fish and Game the authority to promulgate
regulations consistent with the compact. 143 The legislature has taken steps

to ensure that the compacts do not become more than contractual arrangements between the state and the tribe by mandating that the compact
"shall be enforceable by the parties only to the extent and in the form
44
or forms provided for under the terms of the agreement or compact."'
This piecemeal authorization gives the legislature direct control over
any tribal-state compact, while allowing it to avoid considering any of
the details of the agreement. However, the legislature has retained control
over the particulars of specific tribal-state agreements, when the details
are of concern to the legislature. In one instance, the legislature went

so far as to require specific provisions in a compact if certain conditions
were met.

145

Essentially, California has established compacts by granting

will of Congress, his power is at is lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional power of Congress over the matter." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Thus, in citing Justice Jackson's concurrence, the
New Mexico Supreme Court implied that had the governor acted under a statute that did not violate
the express separation of powers provision in the New Mexico Constitution, he may have acted
constitutionally. However, given the court's grave separation of powers concerns, it may be difficult
to meet their standard.
140. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19445 (1995).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 16006 (Supp. 1996) (granting "the department [the
authority (subject to the approval of the Fish and Game Commission) to] enter into . .. a compact
with the Covelo Indian Community respecting jurisdiction and authority to regulate traditional Indian
subsistence fishing practices..."); id. § 16530 (granting the director of the Fish and Game Department
the authority to enter into a "compact with the Hoopa Valley Business Council regarding the taking
of fish from the Trinity River. . . or with the Yurok Tribe, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs acting
as trustee for the Yurok Indians, regarding the taking of fish from the Klamath River.
143. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 16011.
144. Id.§ 16540.
145. Id. § 16532 (permitting a compact with the Klamath River Indian Tribes allowing provisions
for commercial sales of salmon and salmon fishing by traditional methods if the compact includes
provisions (a) separating salmon taken for commercial purposes from those caught for subsistence
use; (b) limiting the number of salmon to be sold; and (c) ensuring that a portion of the sales go
to programs to benefit the tribe).
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such specific and limited compacting authority to executive agencies that
it is unlikely to violate even the most rigorous application of the separation
of powers doctrine while allowing the legislature to retain strict control
over the compacts terms. 146
3.

Washington Combines a Special Board with the Final Word
Going to the Governor
The State of Washington took a different tack when it developed its
IGRA compacting statute. 14 7 The Washington statute grants the authority
to execute the compacts to the governor.1 48 However, it gives the power
to negotiate the compacts to the State's Gambling Commission Director. 49
Moreover, it requires "one standing committee from each house of the
legislature [to] hold a public hearing" on a proposed compact once the
negotiations have been finalized.' 50 This process permits the legislature
to become active in the public debate over the appropriateness of the
proposed compact; however, the legislature never has an opportunity to
vote on or approve the compact directly."15 Rather, if the compact is
approved by the Gambling Commission, it is forwarded to the state

146. California, like New Mexico, Nebraska and Arizona, has an explicit separation of powers
provision. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3. Even with this explicit provision, the California courts
have permitted limited delegation of authority as long as the scope of the agency's authority is
well defined and limited by the legislature. California Radioactive Materials Management Forum v.
Department of Health Serv., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.46.360 (1996). The statue reads:
9.46.360. Indian tribes-Compact negotiation process
(1) The negotiation process for compacts with federally recognized Indian tribes
for conducting class III gaming, as defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
25 U.S.C. Sec. 2701 et seq., on federal Indian lands is governed by this section.
(2) The gambling commission through the director or the director's designee shall
negotiate compacts for class III gaming on behalf of the state with federally
recognized Indian tribes in the state of Washington.
(3) [tentative compacts are to be sent] to all voting and ex officio members of
the gambling commission ....
(5) Within thirty days after receiving a proposed compact from the director, one
standing committee from each house of the legislature shall hold a public hearing
on the proposed compact and forward its respective comments to the gambling
commission. [This section goes on to establish the standing committees for each
house.]
(6) The gambling commission may hold public hearings on the proposed compact
any time after receiving a copy of the compact from the director. Within fortyfive days after receiving the proposed compact . . . the gambling commission ...
shall vote on whether to return the proposed compact to the director with instructions
for further negotiation or to forward the proposed compact ,to the governor for
review and final execution ....
(9) [grants the commission the power to enforce the provisions of compacts
established under these provisions].
Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. § 43.06.010(14).
149. See id. § 9.46.360(2).
150. Id. § 9.46.360(5).
151. See id. § 49.46.360(6).
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the final authority to decide whether to execute
governor, who then 1has
52
the 'compact or not.
C. Legislative Ratification
In response to the Kansas Supreme Court's ruling in Finney I, the
Kansas State Legislature passed extensive and detailed legislation governing
the state's power to compact under the IGRA.5 3 This statute authorizes
the governor or the governor's designated representative to negotiate
compacts pursuant to IGRA on behalf of the State of Kansas. 5 4 In
conformance with the separation-of-powers issues raised by the Finney
I court, the statute also requires ratification by majority vote of both
houses of the state legislature or by a majority vote of the Legislative
Coordinating Council when the legislature is not in session.' 55 Thus, unlike
some of the statutes discussed above, the Kansas statute addresses the
issues of separation of powers, which so concerned to the Kansas and
New Mexico Supreme Courts.
Interestingly, the Kansas legislature also added a number of provisions
to the statute which significantly increase its control over the negotiating

152. Interestingly, this is an up-or-down vote, much like what a legislature might get. The governor
cannot renegotiate the compact at that point, however, the board will likely renegotiate if the
governor rejects the compact.
153. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-2302 (1993). This statute includes the following language:
46-2302. Negotiation of compacts; submission to legislature; approval or rejection;
attorney general as legal counsel; compact provisions; report of governor to legislature ....
(b) The governor or the governor's designated representatives are authorized to
negotiate gaming compacts on behalf of the state of Kansas. At the conclusion of
negotiations, the governor shall submit the proposed compact to the joint committee
on gaming compacts for the joint committee's recommendations as to approval or
modification of the proposed compact.
(c) If the joint committee recommends modification of a proposed compact
submitted by the governor, the governor or the governor's representatives may
resume negotiations in accordance with the joint committee's recommendations and
the modified proposed compact shall be submitted to the joint committee in the
same manner as the original proposed compact. Within 5 days after receiving the
joint committee's recommended modifications, the governor shall notify the joint
committee, in writing, as to whether or not the governor has resumed negotiations.
Within 10 days after receipt of notice that the governor has not resumed negotiations,
or if the governor fails to notify the joint committee that the governor has resumed
negotiations, the joint committee shall vote to recommend approval or rejection of
the proposed compact or shall vote to make no recommendation on the proposed
compact.
(d) (1) [This section permits the legislature to vote to approve or reject the
proposed compact when it is in session and authorizes the governor to execute the
compact when approval is granted].
(2) [This section permits the legislative coordinating council to approve or reject
the compact when the legislature is not in session and authorizes the governor to
execute the compact when approval is granted.] ....
Id.; accord IDAHO CODE § 67-429A (Supp. 1994) (granting governor authority to negotiate and
execute compacts under certain conditions, requiring that the compact not obligate the state to
appropriate state funds, and reserving a legislative veto).
154. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-2302(b).
155. Id. § 46-2302(d)(1)-(2).
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process and the content of tribal-state compacts. Specifically, the statute
provides for extensive involvement by a joint committee on gaming
compacts. 5 6 This committee is the first stop for a negotiated, but still
proposed, tribal-state compact.' 57 The joint committee can then approve
the compact or resubmit it to the governor for specific modifications. 158
The governor may then renegotiate the compact under the recommendations of the committee or refuse to renegotiate.' 5 9 Ultimately, the joint
committee will vote to recommend approval or rejection of the compact
or to make no recommendation at all to the full legislature. The legislature
will then vote on whether to ratify the compact. Thus, through its joint
committee, the legislature maintains close control over the terms of the
proposed compact and additionally gains influence over the tenor of the
negotiations.
Apparently desiring additional control over the process, the Kansas
legislature also required specific language to be included in each compact
negotiated on behalf of the state.1'6 The current language requires that
each compact provide a mechanism by which either party may renegotiate
the compact. 16 The statute specifically requires that this mechanism permit
the legislature itself to request renegotiation of the compacts.' 62 Thus,
through its renegotiation clause, the influence of its joint committee, and
the power of its ratification procedure, the Kansas legislature has ensured
a significant and continuing role in the development of tribal-state compacts under the auspices of IGRA.
Significantly, this extensive and complicated structure for negotiating
tribal-state compacts only permits IGRA compacts on gaming to be
established. Presumably because of the ruling in Finney I and the limited
reach of this statute, the State of Kansas has no authority to negotiate
and execute tribal-state compacts on any subject other than gaming.
However, given the detail of this statute and its clear response to the
court's concerns in Finney I, Indian tribes compacting with the State of
Kansas can be assured that a compact entered into in accordance with
the act will not be subject to a state constitutional challenge.
IV.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The decisions by the supreme courts in New Mexico and Kansas and
the disturbing lack of any significant mention of Indian nations in most
state constitutions point to the need for a structure for tribal-state governmental relations in state constitutions. The author proposes the fol-

156.
powers
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162..

Id. § 46-2302(b); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-2303 (1993)
and structure of the joint committee on gaming compacts.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-2302(b).
See id. § 46-2302(b)-(c).
See id. § 46-2302(c).
See id. § 46-2302(f)(I)-(2).
See id.
See id.

for a in-depth look at the
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lowing constitutional amendment to the Constitution of the State of New
Mexico 63 as an initial source for that structure:
RELATIONS WITH INDIAN NATIONS, TRIBES, AND PUEBLOS.
Section 1. SOVEREIGNTY. The State of New Mexico recognizes
the independent sovereignty of the Indian Nations, Tribes, and Pueblos
located within the geographic boarders of this State and the United
States.
Section 2. COMPACTS. The Governor of the State of New Mexico,
as the chief executive of the state, shall have the power, with the
advice and consent of the legislature, to negotiate and execute any
agreement or compact with those sovereign Indian Nations, Tribes,
or Pueblos located within the geographic boarders of this state or
the United States, provided two-thirds of each house of the legislature
concur. The legislature shall have the power, by appropriate legislation,
to establish procedures by which it shall give the governor its advice
on and grant its consent to such proposed compacts.
Section 3. FINALITY. Compacts entered into by the State shall bind
the State to the terms thereof. Conflicts in the terms of two Compacts
between the same parties shall be resolved under procedures set out
in the Compacts. Statutes passed by the legislature after the execution
of a Compact shall have no bearing on its validity or its enforcement.
Only federal statutory or constitutional challenges or state constitutional challenges or pre-execution state statutory challenges to Compacts executed under this article shall be considered by the Courts
of this State, no other challenges can invalidate such a compact.
Section 4. ENFORCEMENT. Any Indian Nation, Tribe, or Pueblo
that has entered into a Compact with the State of New Mexico shall
have standing in the courts of New Mexico to enforce the provisions
of any compact that it is a party to, or to challenge any State statute
enacted after the execution of the Compact on the basis that it
interferes with the Compact.
This amendment is intended to provide a clear structure to govern the
state's relationship with its sovereign Indian neighbors. Significantly, the
broad outlines of this relationship reach well beyond the Indian gaming
issues. The proposed amendment recognizes that state-tribal relations can
and should reach beyond the current conflict over gambling on tribal
lands. Moreover, the proposed amendment authorizes compacting with
all tribes within the geographic borders of the United States, not limiting
potential state-tribal cooperation and joint ventures to those tribes within
the geographic borders of New Mexico.
New Mexico has already recognized the need for cooperation between
the State and the tribes by enacting legislation authorizing such cooperation

163. This proposed amendment could be easily altered to fit other state constitutions as well.
For purposes of analysis, this amendment will be considered in light of the constitutional and
statutory discussion above.
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between state and tribal law enforcement agencies.164 The California
experience also points to additional areas where state-tribal cooperation
and mutual assistance is warranted. 65 This proposed amendment will
provide a structure within which such cooperation can be initiated and
organized, based on mutual respect and understanding.
Section 1 of the amendment simply recognizes the status of the tribes
under federal law, 166 and tribal independence from the state, as has been
recognized by the New Mexico courts.' 67 While this provision does not
change the state's recognition of tribal status, it does make a clear
statement to tribal governments and to the state government that any
agreements or compacts made under this provision will be made between
two equal and independent sovereigns. Ideally, this will help negotiations
get beyond the traditional psychological barrier of mistrust between many
of the tribes and the State of New Mexico.
Section 2 lays out in clear and certain terms the respective powers of
the governor and the legislature in compacting with the tribes, without
getting bogged down in the details of the day-to-day relationship between
those two branches. The governor is empowered to negotiate with the
tribes over any matter of mutual interest, while the legislature retains
the final authority to approve any proposed compacts. This section
requires the advice as well as the consent of the legislature. This clause
is intended to permit greater legislative involvement in the initiation of
negotiations as well as their progress and the final approval of any
proposed compact. The parameters of this authority is deliberately left
to the legislature to permit flexibility in its application and alterations
as experience is gained. 6 Finally, the super-majority requirement that
two-thirds of both houses of the legislature ratify proposed state-tribal
compacts is intended to assure careful deliberation because any executed
compact will have the force of law, and the only means for altering that
law is with the consent of the compacting tribe.
Section 3 of the proposed amendment is intended to ensure that the
compacts, once executed, are essentially unalterable. This will provide
the parties to the compact with the confidence that the agreement they
have entered into is stable. Section 3 places the compact on a different
plane from normal statues. While compacts will not be interpreted to
alter existing statutory law, legislation passed after the execution of a
compact, likewise, cannot alter the terms of the compact. This assures
164. See Mutual Aid Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-8-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994). See also Joint
Powers Agreement Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-1-I to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
165. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 16532 (permitting a compact with the Klamath River
Indian Tribes allowing provisions for commercial sales of salmon and salmon fishing by traditional
methods).
166. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 29 (1831) (recognizing tribes as "domestic
dependent nations").
167. See, e.g., Jim v. CIT, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (recognizing that the Navajo
Nation is sovereign and is entitled to Full, Faith and Credit, as a Territory, under federal law).
168. The governor will have input into any statutes governing this relationship through his veto
authority.
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the tribes that the state will not try to back out of agreements by passing
a statute to alter the terms of a compact. At the same time, it assures
the state that compacts will not be interpreted by the New Mexico courts
to alter or vitiate established state law.
While it is unlikely that any tribe will choose to submit itself to the
judgment of New Mexico courts, section 4 does emphasize the availability
of the state's courts to enforce the provisions of compacts. It is more
likely that the state and tribes will establish other provisions for en69
However, this section does provide the
forcement within each compact.
enforcement of a compact and perhaps
for
option
additional
an
with
tribes
interfering with the provisions of
statute
a
challenge
to
means
only
the
a compact.
V.

WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION?

The essential difference between a constitution and a statute is that
a constitution usually states general principles or policies, and establishes a foundation of law and government, whereas a statute must
provide the details of the subject of the statute. A constitution, unlike
to meet existing conditions, but to
a statute, is intended not merely
1 70
govern future contingencies.
A constitutional amendment will provide the people of New Mexico
with an opportunity to set out a structure for our state's relations with
our Indian neighbors rather than having our elected political leaders
squabble over the power and authority to make such agreements. Moreover, such an amendment is in the interest of the tribes. As the Finney
I court noted, "[ilt would be no service . . . [to] tribes . . . who are
seeking negotiations with [a] [sitate . ..leading to tribal-state compacts,
to leave the [questions of the constitutionality of unilateral action by
governors or statutes which delegate legislative authority to the executive
branch] unresolved and let those involved proceed at the peril of subsequent invalidation of the negotiations.''117
The underlying principles of the American separation-of-powers tradition urges a constitutional balancing of the executive and legislative
authority in the compacting arena. James Madison made it clear that
the separation of governmental powers into three distinct branches is
intended to ensure liberty by avoiding the accumulation of those powers
in one branch. 72 "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
many . ..
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, 1or
' 73
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'

169. Such enforcement procedures are permitted under § 3 of the proposed amendment.
170. See Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Finney (Finney I1), 867 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Kan. 1994) (citing
1-6C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 13).
171. 836 P.2d at 1176. These compacts addressed everything from interstate water use to cooperation
on higher education.
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 211 (James Madison) (Charles Beard ed., 1948).
173. Id.
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On the other hand, the Kansas state legislature apparently overcame
state constitutional separation-of-powers problems simply by passing a
statute. Likewise, the California legislature has avoided separation-ofpowers issues by addressing each potential compact individually and
distinctly, while reserving its legislative authority for itself. The New
Mexico Supreme Court in Clark v. Johnson observed that New Mexico
has similarly "entered into at least twenty-two different compacts with
other sovereign entities, including the United States and other states."'' 7 4
In each of these cases, "New Mexico entered into the compact with the
enactment of a statute by the legislature" which was then signed by the
governor. '71
Admittedly, it may be possible to establish a non-constitutional scheme
to address the issues raised by the IGRA statute and the Johnson decision.
However, such an action would be short-sighted and would not address
the fundamental question of what the appropriate balance of power
between the state government's branches should be when establishing
relationships with other sovereigns. As the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Johnson observed, residual governmental authority generally rests in
the legislative branch. Thus, the governor's role in establishing compacts
between the state and other sovereigns is relegated to the limited role
of "approving or vetoing the legislation that approves the compact"
under the state's current constitutional provisions. 76
This result is not by some grand design of the framers of the state's
constitution, but instead flows from the failure of the framers to foresee
the need to structure the state's relations with other sovereigns. 77 Unlike
the state's constitutional framers, the framers of the Federal Constitution
were clearly faced with the need for a structure to guide sovereign-tosovereign relationships. In particular, they needed to establish a procedure
through which the United States government could make agreements with
other nations. The Federal Constitution grants the authority to make
treaties with other sovereigns to the President, while requiring the "Advice
and Consent of the Senate."''

v8

This arrangement allows for flexibility

in the negotiation of such agreements, while reserving to the legislative
body the responsibility of deliberation. 79
Given the need for a single voice in foreign affairs and in negotiating
a treaty,8 0 the United States Constitution grants that authority to the
President.'
However, to avoid the passage of ill-considered treaties
through haste, inadvertence, or design, the framers required the President

174. Johnson, 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24. See Appendix A of the Johnson decision for
a list of these compacts. Id. at 27-28.
175. Id. at 24.
176. Id. 120 N.M. at 575, 904 P.2d at 24 (citations omitted).
177. State-to-State relations could be addressed in a manner similar to that proposed for tribalstate relations.
178. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 319 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles Beard ed., 1948).
180. See Id.
181. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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8 2 "[T]he joint possession
to seek the advice and consent of the Senate.
of the [treaty making] power . . ., by the President and Senate, afford[s]
of security, than the separate possession of it by either
a greater prospect
'8 3
of them.'
The proposed state constitutional amendment would likewise provide
for the careful consideration of every compact by giving the legislature
the power of final approval, while granting the executive the flexibility
to work out an agreement. The power of making compacts, like the
power of making treaties, should not be viewed as either a legislative
or executive function, but rather as blending of their authority. Alexander
Hamilton's description of the Treaty Making power is illustrative:
The power of making treaties . . . relates neither to the execution of
the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less
to an exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts with
foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the
obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department,84
and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.
Thus, as Hamilton points out, the contours of the power to make
agreements with other sovereigns require a blending of the two departments. "The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit
agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of trust, and the
operation of treaties as law, plead strongly for the participation of the
85
whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them."'
The proposed amendment is necessary to alter the only balance that
8 6 Such an arrangement is
the New Mexico Supreme Court can enforce.
a significant improvement over the legislation/veto procedures currently
permitted under the New Mexico constitution. It will improve the deliberative process through which such compacts could be established, while
also allowing the executive branch to use the governor's single voice
effectively to craft cogent compacts.

CONCLUSION
The passage of the Federal IGRA statute may have ushered in a new
era of tribal-state relations. However, a structure for state governments
VI.

182. Tmt FEDERALIST No. 75, at 319 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles Beard ed., 1948). Similarly
the presentment clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3, in the Federal Constitution ensure careful
deliberation on matters of national concern. The veto power "establishes a salutary check upon
the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy,
or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that
" THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 312 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles Beard ed., 1948). Thus,
body ..
the community is protected from "the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."
Id.
183. TrE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 319 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles Beard, ed., 1948).
184. Id.at 318.
185. Id.
186. See Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 570, 904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995).
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is needed before these new relationships can begin in earnest. State
constitutions uniformly fail to adequately address how these sovereignto-sovereign relationships are to be managed and their frequently explicit
separation-of-powers provisions create barriers to efficient procedures for
establishing compacts. The current crisis over Indian gaming in New
Mexico is illustrative of the consequences of this failure. Therefore,
constitutional provisions, such as the one proposed herein, must be
fashioned to allow such sovereign-to-sovereign relationships to flourish.
MAXWELL CARR-HOWARD

